Law as a Second-Order Essentially Contested Concept by Burg, W. (Wibren) van der
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjpn20
Jurisprudence
An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought
ISSN: 2040-3313 (Print) 2040-3321 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpn20
Law as a Second-Order Essentially Contested
Concept
Wibren van der Burg
To cite this article: Wibren van der Burg (2017) Law as a Second-Order Essentially Contested
Concept, Jurisprudence, 8:2, 230-256, DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2016.1189156
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/20403313.2016.1189156
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 10 Aug 2016.




Law as a Second-Order Essentially Contested
Concept
Wibren van der Burg*
Since Gallie introduced the notion of essentially contested concepts, it has given
rise to considerable debate and confusion. The aim of this paper is to bring
clarity to these debates by offering a critical reconstruction of the notion of
essential contestedness. I argue that we should understand essentially
contestable concepts as concepts that refer to ideals or to concepts and
phenomena that can only be fully understood in light of ideals and that are, as
a consequence, open to pervasive contestation. Moreover, some concepts are
second-order essentially contested: it may be a matter of ongoing dispute as to
whether they should be regarded as essentially contested. The concept of law
is an example. Some authors argue that it is ideal-oriented, whereas others
claim it is not. This insight that ‘law’ is a second-order essentially contested
concept may explain some of the disagreements between legal positivism and
its various opponents.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1956, WB Gallie introduced the notion of essentially contested concepts. These
were ‘concepts the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about
their proper uses on the part of their users’.1 Since then, the notion has become
popular in various disciplines of the humanities and social sciences.2 It helps us
understand why certain debates are so intensely and unceasingly fought—while at
the same time being neither futile nor merely confused.
Even so, the notion has given rise to considerable debate and confusion.3 First,
there is much confusion and disagreement about how the notion of essentially con-
tested concepts should be deﬁned or identiﬁed.4 Frequently, especially in legal scho-
larship, the term is used in a very loose way as meaning little more than a concept
that is ‘very hotly contested, with no resolution in sight’.5 Second, various authors
have argued that the notion cannot explain political disagreement;6 some have
even rejected the notion altogether.7 Finally, it is often controversial as to whether
speciﬁc concepts, such as ‘law’ or ‘democracy’, should be called essentially
contested.8
This paper has three connected aims. First, I want to bring clarity to these
debates by offering a critical reconstruction of the notion of essential contestedness
in terms of ideal-orientation. Second, I introduce the notion of second-order essen-
tial contestedness; some concepts give rise to controversies about whether they are
essentially contested or not, because according to some authors, we must under-
stand them in terms of ideals, whereas others advocate that they can be understood
in neutral terms. Third, I argue that the concept of law is a second-order essentially
1 WB Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ (1956) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167
(hereafter ‘ECC’). This article is reprinted as a separate chapter in WB Gallie, Philosophy and the His-
torical Understanding (Chatto & Windus 1964). The book version contains numerous minor stylistic
changes, a few major changes, and more elaborate discussions of examples like ‘religion’, ‘art’ and
‘justice’. I will only refer to the book chapter when there are relevant differences.
2 A Google Scholar search for “essentially contested concept” results in 5760 matches; Gallie’s article
has been cited 2846 times (search date: 11 April 2016).
3 In this article, I will refer to “essentially contested concept” as a “notion” rather than as a “concept”
(although it obviously is a concept). This is to avoid confusion by using the same word––“con-
cept”––both for speciﬁc concepts like ‘law’ and ‘democracy’, and for ‘essentially contested
concept’ at a meta-level referring to those speciﬁc concepts. I have used double quotation marks
(as in “word”) to refer to words, and single quotation marks to refer to concepts (as in ‘concepts’).
4 This confusion may partly be attributed to the sometimes confusing and imprecise way Gallie intro-
duces and elaborates upon the notion. For example, he gives alternative formulations for some of
the seven conditions with minor or even major differences in meaning.
5 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?’ (2002) 21 Law
and Philosophy 137, 149.
6 John Gray, ‘Political Power, Social Theory and Essential Contestability’ in David Miller and Larry Sie-
denkopf (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (Clarendon 1983) 75–101.
7 See Christine Swanton, ‘On the ‘Essential Contestedness’ of Political Concepts’ (1985) 95 Ethics 811;
Clarke, ‘Eccentrically Contested Concepts’ (1979) 9 British Journal of Political Science 122.
8 For ‘law’, see the references in Section 6; for ‘democracy’, see Arnold J Heidenheimer, ‘Disjunctions
Between Corruption And Democracy? A Qualitative Exploration’ (2004) 42 Crime, Law & Social
Change 99.
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contested concept; acknowledging this may help us better understand the debates
between legal positivists and non-positivists.
Gallie has suggested seven conditions for identifying an essentially contested
concept, but both the status and the precise meaning of these criteria remain
vague. Moreover, many authors simply ignore some of them.9 Therefore, I will
begin this paper with a critical discussion of these conditions. I will argue that we
should divide them into four semantic and three pragmatic criteria. The semantic
criteria are important characteristics of the notion that are crucial for our under-
standing of essential contestedness, whereas two of the pragmatic criteria can be
omitted, because they do not embody necessary requirements. The ﬁfth criterion
refers to the pragmatic requirement that there actually is a contest. It allows us to
make a distinction between contested and contestable––essentially contested con-
cepts are essentially contestable concepts that are actually contested. Then I will
suggest that the reason certain concepts are essentially contested or contestable is
that they refer to an ideal or an ideal-oriented phenomenon. Such an understand-
ing in terms of ideals does justice to the most important ideas in Gallie’s work, and
offers an illuminating framework for analysing normative debates. Finally, I will
introduce the notion of second-order essentially contested or contestable concepts.
The most important example of such a concept is the concept of law. The insight
that law is a second-order essentially contested concept may clarify some theoretical
debates, especially those between legal positivists and non-positivists.
Gallie introduces the notion of essentially contested concepts as an explanation
for evident and persistent disagreements as to the proper use of certain terms. His
examples include ‘art’, ‘democracy’, ‘the Christian tradition’, ‘social justice’ and
‘good’.10 However, in my view, it is of special importance to law and politics. Both
in law and in politics (at least the democratic versions of politics), the existence
and legitimacy of disagreement is institutionalised as essential to the core business,
in highly regulated court proceedings and in more open parliamentary and public
debates, respectively. Hence, a notion that explains the intractability of some of
these disagreements is highly relevant for disciplines that study law and politics.
Therefore, in this paper, I will focus on legal and political concepts.
2. GALLIE’S SEVEN CONDITIONS FOR IDENTIFYING ESSENTIALLY
CONTESTED CONCEPTS
Gallie does not present a formal deﬁnition, and this is one of the points where the
reader might wish for more analytic precision in the presentation. However, Gallie
distinguishes seven conditions of essential contestedness.11 I suggest that we should
9 Kenneth M. Ehrenberg, ‘Law is Not (Best Considered) an Essentially Contested Concept’ (2011) 7
International Journal of Law in Context 209, 213: ‘theorists routinely discount one or more criteria.’
10 The ﬁrst three examples are discussed in Gallie, ‘ECC’, 168, 180–87. ‘Social justice’ is discussed at 187;
‘good’ at 194–5.
11 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 171–2.
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divide these conditions or criteria into two clusters. The ﬁrst cluster is one of seman-
tics; these criteria pertain to the meaning of concrete essential contested concepts.
According to Gallie, an essentially contested concept is (1) an appraisive concept,
(2) which signiﬁes or accredits an internally complex achievement that is (3)
initially variously describable and (4) open. The second cluster is one of pragmatics,
the use of essential contested concepts in actual debates. This includes the other
three conditions: (5) the concept is used both aggressively and defensively, (6) it
derives from an original exemplar that all contestants accept as authoritative, and
(7) it is plausible that the continuing dispute enables the original exemplar’s
achievement to be sustained and/or developed in an optimum fashion.
Although Gallie does not use the terms semantic and pragmatic, he singles out
the ﬁrst four conditions as the ‘four most important necessary conditions’.12
Whereas the ﬁrst four criteria have been generally accepted in the theoretical litera-
ture, the three latter criteria are quite controversial, and are often simply omitted.13
In addition to these seven criteria, there is another important aspect to Gallie’s
theory: namely, the function of characterising a concept as essentially contested.
What is it that we gain—if anything—if we understand that a certain concept is
essentially contested? For Gallie, the central point of introducing the notion is
that it may explain why some disputes are endless and yet perfectly genuine.14
In the remainder of this section, I will critically discuss each of the seven criteria;
in Section 3, the function of explaining persistent disagreement.15 I will provide a
charitable reconstruction of each of the criteria, partly in my own words, as
Gallie’s own presentation is often vague and difﬁcult to understand. I will then
discuss the criteria, also in light of the vast critical literature since 1956, to decide
which of them is essential and which may be disregarded.
2.1. The Concept is Evaluative
The evaluative character is the ﬁrst condition mentioned by Gallie—he uses the
term ‘appraisive’. Essentially contested concepts need not be purely evaluative;
examples such as ‘art’ or ‘democracy’ are both descriptive and evaluative. According
to Gallie, the partly evaluative character of the concept implies that we cannot
12 Ibid 172, 174. However, in the book version of the article, he skips this qualiﬁcation, and merely refers
to the ﬁrst four conditions as the conditions that ‘sufﬁce to explain how and why the kind of situation
might arise’ of persistent disagreement. Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (n 1) 161. In
this version, he also explicitly clusters the ﬁrst ﬁve conditions together as ‘the formal––or in a loose
sense the logical––conditions to which apparently the use of any essentially contested concept must
conform’. So in one clustering, the ﬁfth condition is included, in the other it is excluded. This ambig-
uous status is reﬂected in my suggestion in this section, that the ﬁfth condition is not crucial to under-
standing essential contestability, but in a weak interpretation is the criterion that distinguishes
contestable concepts from contested concepts.
13 Eugene Carver, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts: The Ethics and Tactics of Argument’ (1990) 23 Phil-
osophy and Rhetoric 251.
14 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 169.
15 For a helpful discussion of each of the criteria, see David Collier, Fernando Daniel Hidalgo and
Andrea Olivia Maciuceanu, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts: Debates and Applications’ (2006) 11
Journal of Political Ideologies 211.
233Jurisprudence
appeal merely to empirical or logical criteria to decide which conception is the best.
Purely descriptive concepts such as ‘tree’ or ‘water’ cannot be essentially contested,
because they are not evaluative.
This characteristic is uncontroversial, and it is frequently at stake when someone
argues that a concept is not essentially contested. For example, Kenneth Ehrenberg
has argued that a concept like ‘law’ is best not regarded as essentially contested,
because it can be understood in a normatively neutral way.16 (I will discuss the
example of ‘law’ In Section 6.) A similar point could be made by those who
believe in a purely empirical concept of ‘democracy’. If the concept of ‘democracy’
could be understood without reference to underlying values, we could merely
specify the minimum conditions required to call a political system democratic,
and there would be no reason for a persistent disagreement after this stipulative
deﬁnition had been accepted. However, non-positivist authors with a more substan-
tive, value-laden understanding of democracy might reply that democracy is
oriented towards the ideal of democracy, and indirectly towards ideals such as equal-
ity and human rights, and that therefore we may debate endlessly about what it pre-
cisely implies.
2.2. The Concept is Internally Complex
The concept involves various dimensions or elements. For a full description, we
need to include all these elements, but we cannot simply disaggregate them.
When discussing the concept of democracy, Gallie further elaborates on this cri-
terion as that it ‘admits of a variety of descriptions in which its different aspects
are graded in different orders of importance’.17 For example, elements of democ-
racy are the majority principle, the equality of all citizens, and continuous active par-
ticipation; each of these elements should be included in our description, but we may
grade their importance differently, and we may interpret each of them differently.
The British parliamentary system is in many respects different from the German
system; yet both embody defensible conceptions of democracy. We cannot reduce
‘democracy’ to a one-dimensional concept by deﬁning it in terms of merely one
of these elements. Gallie takes a holistic approach to this criterion of internal com-
plexity. Although the explanation of the value of the concept must include
16 Ehrenberg (n 9). Like a number of authors, Ehrenberg incorrectly replaces appraisive with normative
rather than with evaluative. However, ‘normative’ has either a different meaning or a broader one
than ‘appraisive’. On the one hand, it has a different meaning if we distinguish between values and
norms, as standards of evaluation and action guides respectively. Then ‘normative’ interpreted in a
narrow sense as action-guiding means something different than ‘appraisive’ interpreted as referring
to standards of evaluation. If we understand ‘normative’ as ‘action-guiding’, ‘beautiful’ is evaluative or
appraisive, but not normative. On the other hand, ‘normative’ has a broader meaning than ‘apprai-
sive’ if we deﬁne ‘normative’ with the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy as ‘couched in terms expres-
sive of requirements or standards’ (Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy [Oxford
University Press 2008] 254). This broader meaning would include both normative in the narrow
sense of action guiding and evaluative. In this interpretation, ‘appraisive’ or ‘evaluative’ is a subclass
of ‘normative’.
17 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 184.
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reference to the respective contributions of its various elements, the value is attrib-
uted to it as a whole.18 The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
William E Connolly has expanded on this idea by suggesting that essentially con-
tested concepts may be understood as cluster concepts. Cluster concepts are those to
which a broad and variable range of criteria apply, and which are themselves also
relatively complex and open; these criteria are often cluster concepts as well.19 To
make a cluster concept intelligible, we must demonstrate its complex connections
with a host of other concepts to which it is related.20 Connolly argues that concep-
tual disputes arise for three reasons: namely, people jointly employing a cluster
concept weigh the importance of shared criteria differently; they interpret the
meaning of these criteria differently; and they add or drop criteria.
There is a substantial consensus regarding the idea that essentially contested
concepts are internally complex.21 Consequently, a frequent claim is that because
certain concepts are not internally complex, they cannot be essentially contested.
Kenneth Ehrenberg has elaborated on this negative argument.22 He suggests that
concepts that seem to be essentially contested can sometimes be partly disaggre-
gated by dissecting them into various elements, some of which are merely descrip-
tive, while others might be evaluative. Such disaggregated concepts would then
no longer be usefully regarded as essentially contested; only those constituent
elements that are evaluative would be essentially contested. To take a simple
example: if we could deﬁne ‘law’ in terms of two elements––a system of rules and
orientation towards the value of legality––we might argue that the element of a
system of rules is a descriptive component, and that only the value of legality is an
evaluative component and that only legality can therefore be essentially contested.
Then, in line with Ehrenberg’s argument, it would be better to disaggregate the
concept of law, and to say that ‘law’ itself is not essentially contested, only ‘legality’
is.
His argument is analytically correct; a concept that is not complex and not eva-
luative is not essentially contested. However, it will often be controversial as to
whether concepts can be disaggregated in the way Ehrenberg suggests. There
may not be a neutral answer to this question; in fact, it is precisely the point on
which opposing schools differ. With regard to the concept of ‘law’, most legal posi-
tivists defend that descriptive elements—for example, the sources of law—are
enough to deﬁne it, whereas most non-positivists argue that if we restrict ourselves
to descriptive elements, we miss a dimension crucial to our understanding of law,
namely that it is oriented towards the value of legality.23
18 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 172; Waldron (n 5) 150.
19 Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (DC Heath 1974) 14.
20 Ibid 14; John N Gray, ‘On the Contestability of Social and Political Concepts’ (1977) 5 Political Theory
331.
21 Collier and others (n 15) 238.
22 Ehrenberg (n 9) 215.
23 See, eg, Philip Selznick, ‘Sociology and Natural Law’ (1961) 6 Natural Law Forum 84; Lon L Fuller,
The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969). For an elaborate discussion see Section 6.
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2.3. The Concept is Variously Describable
According to Gallie, there are ‘a number of possible rival descriptions of [the con-
cept’s] total worth, one such description setting its component parts or features in
one order of importance, a second setting them in a second order, and so on’.24 This
idea has been widely accepted and fruitfully elaborated on in the well-known distinc-
tion between concepts and conceptions, introduced by Rawls and made popular by
Dworkin.25 A conception can be deﬁned as an elaborate interpretation of a concept.
Essentially contested concepts allow for a plurality of conﬂicting conceptions, which
is the result of the evaluative and internally complex character of the concept.26
For Dworkin, there may be different conceptions associated with one concept
but, in his theory of law, participants to the legal practice are guided by the idea
that one conception is better than the others and that therefore one conception
may provide the right answer to a legal question.27 So accepting that a concept
admits of a plurality of conceptions does not imply a relativist position for Dworkin;
on the contrary. At ﬁrst sight, the answer is not so clear in the debate about
whether Gallie’s notion of essentially contested concepts implies a relativistic or
even a sceptical position.28Gallie argues ‘it is quite impossible toﬁnd a general principle
for deciding which of two contestant uses of an essentially contested concept really
“uses it best”’.29 However, that does not exclude judging ‘the rationality of a given indi-
vidual’s continueduse––or in themoredramatic case of conversion, his change of use––
of the concept in question’.30 According to Gallie, a certain piece of evidence or an
argument put forward by one side can be recognised, even by its opponents, to have a
deﬁnite logical force.31 This is not a sceptical position; there are good arguments for
certain conceptions, even if they may not be conclusive in the eyes of everyone. The
parties to a debatemay sincerely believe that their view is the best.32 For example, in a
court case, both attorneys may sincerely believe that their own interpretation of a
24 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 172.
25 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press 1971), 5; referring to HLA Hart, The Concept of
Law (Clarendon 1994 [1961]) 155, 159 who, however, does not use the word conception; Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 103 (referring to Gallie), 134.
26 Swanton (n 7) 819 argues that the distinction between conception and concept should be dropped.
However, her argument presupposes that the concept refers to a common core, and does not hold
against Connolly’s interpretation in terms of a cluster concept (she does not discuss Connolly in
her article).
27 Of course, Dworkin’s right answer thesis has been strongly criticised; I will not go into that debate
here. I merely use it to show that accepting a reasonable pluralism of conceptions can be combined
with a non-relativist position.
28 Eg, Swanton (n 7) 814.
29 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 189 (italics in original).
30 Ibid 189 (italics in original).
31 Ibid 190.
32 In Philosophy and the Historical Understanding, 188, Gallie (n 1) explicitly argues that the case for a par-
ticular interpretation of a given concept may be regarded as ‘advanceable by argument––even if by
argument that can lead to no ﬁnal knock-down conclusion’. For a similar position, see Andrew
Mason, ‘On Explaining Political Disagreement: The Notion of an Essentially Contested Concept’
(1990) 33 Inquiry 81, 87; Waldron (n 5) 153.
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certain constitutional clause is the best—even though they may have to acknowledge
that there is no knockdown argument that compels everyone to accept it.
It seems fair to conclude that Gallie’s view is one in support of legitimate plur-
alism rather than relativism. There is a plurality of reasonable conceptions, each
of which may be supported by good arguments. Even opponents can accept some
arguments and new pieces of evidence as good and as having logical force, but
they need not regard them as conclusive. Sometimes, however, they will be con-
vinced by those arguments or the new evidence, and then their conversion may
be justiﬁable and intellectually respectable.33
2.4. The Concept Must be Open in Character
The concept must have an open and dynamic character, it must admit ‘of consider-
able modiﬁcation in the light of changing circumstances; and such modiﬁcation
cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance’.34 The condition of openness
largely follows from the three previous conditions, but it adds an important aspect:
namely, that the set of possible conceptions is not a ﬁxed one, but may change over
time. Even if there is a current consensus on one speciﬁc conception, this is always
a provisional closure—it may be challenged and adapted in the light of changing cir-
cumstances. This is an important insight if we want to understand historic changes
and the potential for adaptation of concepts in the light of changing circumstances.
‘Democracy’ now has a meaning different from that in classic Athens.
2.5. Each Party to the Discussion Recognises that its Own Conception is Contested;
The Concept is used Both Aggressively and Defensively
Gallie himself seems unclear about this criterion, which is illustrated by the fact that
he gives three different formulations. The ﬁrst formulation states:
each party recognizes the fact that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties,
and that each party must have at least some appreciation of the different criteria in the
light of which the other parties claim to be applying the concept in question.35
The second formulation states ‘to use an essentially contested concept means to use
it against other uses and to recognize that one’s own use of it has to be maintained
against these other uses’.36 The third and simplest formulation is that the parties use
it both aggressively and defensively against other users.37
The basic idea actually has two elements: the parties to a debate acknowledge
that there are alternative conceptions, and they are prepared to defend their
own. This condition has often been criticised in discussions of essential






contestedness. Even Gallie admits that sometimes this condition need not be
present for a concept to be essentially contested.38
Jeremy Waldron has argued that the required awareness that one’s own con-
ception is contested by others is often not present with partisans in actual
debates.39 It is quite unrealistic to expect from ordinary citizens that they have
this kind of philosophical reﬂexivity when they engage in heated political
debates. Frequently, they will believe that there is only one valid conception of
what ‘democracy’ or ‘justice’ entails—namely, their own—and that all others are
mistaken. Moreover, even in philosophical debates, let alone in the heat of actual
debates, it is not always possible for participants to determine whether indeed the
conﬂict turns on different conceptions rather than on emotional bias, prejudice
and lack of education, conﬂicting interests, or simply confusion. Moreover, if they
do not have that awareness yet, but continue to talk past each other, does that
mean that the concept cannot be essentially contested? Does it suddenly become
essentially contested once the parties become aware that they were using different
conceptions?
Gallie does not give clear arguments why precisely this condition is so important.
Perhaps he believes he needs this condition to distinguish between essentially con-
tested concepts and other concepts, such as contingently contested concepts or con-
fused concepts, but the condition fails to do so adequately. First, it arbitrarily
excludes those debates where the parties are not aware that the core of their dis-
agreement is conceptual rather than merely a conﬂict of interests or beliefs. More-
over, it makes the distinction variable in an arbitrary way, as a concept could become
essentially contested merely because suddenly the parties realise that they have
different conceptions—even though the concept itself does not change. Finally, it
does not succeed in excluding contingently contested or confused concepts as
debates on those concepts may sometimes be raging on in full awareness that the
parties have different conceptions. For example, let us assume that I call a certain
ﬂower orange and someone else calls it yellow. We discover that we have different
conceptions of orange. Initially, we may both be convinced that our conception is
the correct one, and thus may be prepared to defend our view aggressively. If
after the debate we still disagree, we may agree to submit our differences to the auth-
ority of ﬁve others. If they all hold that the ﬂower is orange, I should revise my view
of what orange means. I may have been confused and, thus, it turned out that the
concept was only contingently contested.
However, we should not simply discard the ﬁfth condition altogether. We should
skip the ﬁrst element, the requirement of awareness, which is only included in the
two longer formulations mentioned above. The third and shortest version simply
states that the parties to a debate use the concept both aggressively and defensively.
If this merely means that they appeal to the concept in actual debates, we can accept
it—although in a minimal, almost trivial sense. My reconstruction of this require-
ment is simply that there is actually a debate in which the parties appeal to the
38 Ibid 181.
39 Waldron (n 5) 162; see also Ehrenberg (n 9) 224.
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concept or to its implications. This makes clear that it is not a semantic criterion, but
a functional or pragmatic one: essentially contested concepts are concepts that are
used in actual debates.40
This reconstruction may help us solve an ambiguity in Gallie’s work. Not every
concept that meets Gallie’s semantic criteria is actually contested. For example,
there may be a broad consensus about the meaning of ‘democracy’ within a
certain community at a speciﬁc time. Gallie merely remarks, ‘any proper use of
this concept is in the nature of the case contestable, and will, as a rule, be actually
contested’.41 Although Gallie does not elaborate on this distinction between con-
tested and contestable, various authors have done so.42
My suggestion is that the function of the ﬁfth characteristic is to make the distinc-
tion between contested and contestable. Essentially contestable concepts may be
deﬁned as those thatmeet the four semantic criteria. Because of these characteristics,
essentially contestable concepts have a clear potential for contestation. However, that
potential need not always be realised—for example, because we have reached a tem-
porary closure in the debate,43 or because open debate is not possible in a society.44
There can also be—as in law—a generally accepted authority to settle themeaning of
concepts.45 In these instances, although a concept is contestable, it is not seriously
contested—at least not at a speciﬁc time in the history of a speciﬁc community.
I suggest a simple stipulation: namely, that essentially contested concepts are
essentially contestable concepts that are actually contested.46 The reason for this
minimal formulation is that it leaves the question open to further empirical analysis
as to why, and under which speciﬁc conditions, the concept is actually contested. In
the remainder of the article, I will use both “contested” and “contestable”, depend-
ing on the authors discussed and on whether I focus on actual debates or just on the
possibility of debates.
2.6. There is an Original Exemplar
Gallie introduced this condition and the next one in order to distinguish essentially
contested from thoroughly confused concepts. An essentially contested concept is
one coherent concept rather than a combination of two separate concepts simply
40 However, the debate may be both at the general level of the concept itself or merely at the level of
implications; in the latter case there need not be awareness of the plurality of legitimate conceptions.
For example, in debates whether referenda should be included in the democratic system, the focus
may be on different empirical assessments of whether referenda would make decision-making
more or less efﬁcient and just, whereas the underlying differences in conceptions of democracy are
not explicitly addressed although they may inﬂuence how important efﬁciency and justice are per-
ceived to be. In such cases, the concept of democracy is only indirectly or implicitly contested.
41 Ibid 169; see also Gallie, ‘Art as an Essentially Contested Concept’ (1956) 6 The Philosophical Quar-
terly 97, 113.
42 Clarke (n 7) 124; Mason (n 32) 89.
43 Collier and others (n 21) 218, 229, argue that concepts can achieve a stable meaning within a given
framework. A conceptual debate may then be subject to a temporary closure.
44 Gray (n 20) 336–7.
45 Alasdair Macintyre, ‘The Essential Contestability of Some Social Concepts’ (1973) 84 Ethics 1.
46 For a slightly different distinction, see Gray (n 20) 338.
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united under one name. For Gallie, the unity of this concept ﬁnds its basis in a
common exemplar that all contestants regard as authoritative. All contestants
claim to derive their speciﬁc conception from a process of imitation and adaption
from this exemplar. The exemplar need not merely be one example––it can also
be a set of examples or a tradition.47
According to Jeremy Waldron, condition VI is not necessary.48 In his view, the
unity of a contested concept may also be found in a reference to a common
problem or challenge to which different answers are given. This illustrates that
there may be different ways in which we could try to distinguish an essentially
contested concept from a merely confused concept. Other possibilities could
be, for example, referring to a generally accepted formulation of the fundamen-
tal idea (eg, democracy is government of the people, for the people, by the
people), referring to some common minimum elements (eg, democracy requires
at least an equal vote for all citizens and a majority principle) or a combination of
these.
Indeed, this condition has been strongly criticised, and has often been simply
ignored. Even Gallie does not consider it necessary; he introduces conditions VI
and VII as a possibility, as ‘conditional in the extreme’.49 We may safely disregard
it, but that leaves us with a double challenge regarding a critical reconstruction.
Gallie introduces this criterion for two reasons: to provide a contested concept
with a certain unity, and to distinguish it from radically confused concepts. The
unity of the concept may partly be found in Connolly’s idea of cluster concepts, dis-
cussed above. This still leaves us with the challenge as to how to determine whether
speciﬁc concepts are essentially contested or merely radically confused—a chal-
lenge that I will discuss in Sections 4 and 5.
2.7. The Continuing Debate Promotes a Better Understanding and a Fuller
Realisation of the Ideal50
When discussing the concept of democracy, Gallie formulates the basic idea as
follows: the continuous competition between rival conceptions ‘seems likely to
lead to an optimum development of the vague aims and confused achievements of
47 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 176.
48 Waldron (n 5) 158. Numerous authors have criticised the sixth and the seventh criterion; see for
example John Gray, ‘On Liberty, Liberalism and Essential Contestability’ (1978) 8 British Journal
of Political Science 385.
49 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 179. In various places he seems to imply that his sketch is ideal typical (without using the
term), for example, when he suggests that not even ‘art’, ‘democracy’ and ‘social justice’ conform with
perfect precision to the seven conditions (ibid 180) and that ‘each of my live examples conforms suf-
ﬁciently close to my conditions (I)–(VII)’ (ibid 188). In the critical literature, hardly anyone has expli-
citly noticed these remarks: most authors seem to presuppose that Gallie sees the seven conditions as
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. Consequently, many critiques simply miss the mark, for example,
Gray (n 48) 389 (calling the seven criteria necessary conditions). For a similar point see Ehrenberg
(n 9) 227 (suggesting that Gallie does not provide an ‘exhaustive checklist’).
50 It is plausible or probable that ‘the continuous competition for acknowledgement as between the con-
testant users of the concept enables the original exemplar’s achievement to be sustained and/or
developed in optimum fashion’: Gallie, ‘ECC’, 180.
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the democratic tradition’.51 Again, Gallie only introduces it as a possibility; it is not
an essential condition. There may even be situations in which the continuous discus-
sion has strong negative effects: for example, when it leads to savage political clea-
vages between the various parties.52
Gallie’s suggestion is a version of the famous marketplace of ideas. The market-
place of ideas metaphor suggests that if we continuously discuss what ‘democracy’
means, we may sift out less defensible conceptions. For Gallie, the contestation in
the marketplace is not merely an intellectual exercise; it also has practical conse-
quences. As a result of this critical reﬂection, our democratic order may be more
successfully adapted to changing circumstances. Moreover, contestation may lead
to a higher awareness––and perhaps even stronger internalisation––of the values
inherent in the concept, and to a fuller realisation of these values. We should
note, however, that this fuller realisation is not a conceptual necessity but an empiri-
cal possibility, a potential. It will depend on speciﬁc circumstances as to whether this
potential is realised, for example, on a society being open and welcoming public
debate.
We may therefore conclude that, like condition VI, condition VII does not ident-
ify a necessary criterion. However, we may treat it as identifying a potential—which is
in line with Gallie’s own views. In our critical reconstruction of the notion of essen-
tially contested concepts, we should try to take this potential into account, and to see
whether we can do justice to the intuition behind it.
I have now discussed in detail each of the seven conditions suggested by Gallie.
The conclusion is that the ﬁrst four criteria, which are semantic, are crucial to a
good understanding of essentially contested concepts. Each of them offers part of
the explanation as to why conceptual contests are possible, and this explanation is
found in speciﬁc characteristics of the concept. However, an analysis of Gallie’s
three pragmatic conditions leads to the conclusion that only one of them should
be regarded as an inherent part of the notion of essentially contested concepts,
and serves to distinguish them from essentially contestable concepts. Condition V
should be reconstructed as the requirement that the concept should be appealed
to in actual debates in order to be essentially contested rather than contestable.
In light of the criticisms discussed above, condition VI (the reference to the exem-
plar) should be dispensed with altogether. Condition VII identiﬁes merely a poten-
tial, namely, that the contestation may promote a fuller awareness and a better
realisation of the values inherent in the concept.
3. EXPLAINING PERVASIVE DISAGREEMENTS IN LAW AND POLITICS
For Gallie, the primary reason to introduce the notion of essentially contested con-
cepts is to explain the persistent disagreement regarding them. His focus is not on




debates intractable.53 Gallie suggests that there is also a gain for participants in the
debates of this ‘higher order’ recognition.54 If parties to a disagreement understand
that a concept is essentially contested, this may raise the level of quality of the argu-
ment. They may see rival conceptions as being of permanent potential critical value
to their own interpretation.55
Gallie’s suggestion that the notion of essentially contested concepts may help us
understand the persistent nature of debates has been accepted in various disci-
plines, but it seems to have special traction in the study of law and politics. Both
for law and for politics, dealing with clashes of opinions is not merely accidental,
but is essential to the practice. Jeremy Waldron suggests that endless disagreements
belong to the circumstances of politics, but I suggest that they also belong to what may
be called the circumstances of law.56 Legal processes designed to deal with conﬂicting
views and interests are central to the practice of law. This is not true for other prac-
tices such as art, morality or religion; in these practices, clashing views may be a fact
of life, but the practices are not organised in order to provide an adequate response
to these conﬂicts. In other words, understanding and dealing with these conﬂicts is
not central to these practices.
However, although law and politics are both institutions that address pluralism
and conﬂict, they do this in diverse ways. These differences may explain why in
legal theory the notion of essential contestedness has been widely accepted,
whereas in political theory it is much more controversial as an explanation for pol-
itical disagreements.57
Legal processes are structured as a clash between prima facie equally legitimate
conﬂicting views on what a speciﬁc rule, principle or value implies as applied to
the facts of the case. The practice of law in the context of courts is primarily
one of normative argument and interpretation in which the interpretation of
authoritative texts is central. It is an undeniable fact that reasonable and highly
expert parties have conﬂicting views on the contents of the law. In many cases
involving a highest court, attorneys on both sides provide a fully defensible
interpretation. In those legal systems where dissenting opinions exist, it is clearly
visible that even the judges themselves often respectfully but strongly disagree—
and certainly not only in strongly politicised conﬂicts but also on more technical
legal issues.
Many legal debates can be greatly clariﬁed by understanding them as disputes
on the meaning of central concepts such as ‘privacy’ or ‘due care’. It is precisely
53 Gallie, ‘ECC’, 168, argues that the human activities to which these concepts are related belong to the
disciplines of aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion. Later
in the article, he also discusses ethics. He does not mention any non-philosophical discipline.
54 Ibid 192.
55 Ibid 193. See also Connolly (n 19) 40–1; Waldron (n 5) 151–3.
56 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Clarendon 1999) 102.
57 This is not a claim about how frequent the notion is being used: in both disciplines it is quite popular
in the academic literature. It is a claim about how useful the notion is in explaining disagreement. In
political theory there are various authors arguing that the notion of essentially contested concepts is
radically mistaken or cannot account for explaining political disagreement; for references see notes
57 and 58. In legal theory, I have not found similar arguments.
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the point of judicial processes that they restrain conﬂicts by reducing them to
reasonable disagreements about the implications of legal doctrine for concrete
cases. Therefore, the notion of an essentially contested concept provides a ﬁtting
explanation for pervasive disagreements in law. Moreover, it can also explain and
justify why two competing interpretations of a legal doctrine can both be regarded
as legitimate and defensible. It is therefore not surprising that the notion has gained
a broad popularity among legal scholars—although this popularity is not so wide-
spread when it comes to the concept of ‘law’ itself, as I will discuss in Section 6.
In political theory, however, the notion is more controversial. Steven Lukes and
William E Connolly have argued that political core concepts such as ‘power’ and
‘democracy’ may be regarded as essentially contested, and that this may explain
the persistence of political disagreements.58 According to Connolly, conceptual con-
tests are central to politics.59 This is often called the ‘essential contestability thesis’.
However, many political theorists have attacked the thesis. Some critics deny that
political concepts can be essentially contested,60 while others simply argue that
this does not provide a general explanation for disagreement.61 Or to put it more pre-
cisely, analysis in terms of essentially contested concepts is at best largely irrelevant,
but usually blinds us to the more important sources of disagreement.62
It is easy to understand why these critics doubt the explanatory power of the
notion of essentially contested concepts. If we study political conﬂicts, we may see
that they are not only––and usually not even primarily––reasonable disagreements
about the meaning of shared concepts such as ‘justice’ or ‘democracy’. First, not all
concepts playing a role in political debates are shared. ‘Solidarity’ is a concept much
more at home in socialist than in conservative parties; ‘sharia’ is a concept not
shared by secular or Christian-democratic parties; and animal rights are only
defended by some parties. Whereas in law the central concepts have been authori-
tatively laid down, sometimes implicitly, in authoritative sources, this is only partially
true for politics. Second, and more importantly, we should notice that apart from
ideological differences on how to interpret normative concepts, political conﬂicts
are also about protecting speciﬁc interests and about the distribution of power
and money. To understand political conﬂicts, we must also refer to historical, econ-
omic, sociological and psychological theories about belief formation, power, interest
groups and so on.63
58 Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (MacMillan 1974); Connolly (n 19).
59 Connolly (n 19) 6.
60 See Swanton (n 7); Clarke (n 9) 125: ‘the notion of an essentially contested concept is radically
mistaken.’
61 Gray (n 48) argues that the notion may have been useful once, but now constitutes an impediment to
progress.
62 For an intermediate position arguing that essential contestedness provides important insights but
needs to be complemented by a much broader interdisciplinary research perspective, see Mason
(n 32).
63 Of course, Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies have successfully argued that for a full understand-
ing of legal conﬂicts we should also go beyond legal doctrine. However, legal processes are structured
so that, in the end, the conﬂict is reframed into a doctrinal dispute in light of common authoritative
sources.
243Jurisprudence
Consequently, there are many possible foci for understanding incessant dis-
agreement in politics. It is unlikely that an analysis in terms of the semantics of
key concepts in political debate will always provide the most powerful explanation
regarding disagreement—even if it may provide part of the explanation. The attrac-
tiveness of the notion of essentially contested concepts for political theorists will
therefore depend on whether in their research design the primary focus is on ideol-
ogy or on other factors.
4. A CRITICAL RECONSTRUCTION IN TERMS OF IDEALS
Our analysis thus far has identiﬁed certain challenges regarding a critical recon-
struction of the notion of essentially contested or contestable concepts. First, ﬁt:
every critical reconstruction should include the four semantic conditions. Second,
function: it should explain how the notion might help us to understand why some
disagreements are pervasive. Third, unity: it must show how these four conditions
and the function hang together. We have to construct a coherent theory of the
notion with a point that can explain the characteristics rather than merely a
theory in which a number of contingent characteristics are loosely connected.
Fourth, distinctiveness: we must be able to distinguish between essentially contestable
concepts and similar concepts such as radically confused concepts. Finally, robustness:
a reconstruction should attempt to do justice to the two hypotheses with regard to
conditions V and VII.
The two most important challenges are ﬁt and function. Various authors have
emphasised the function or the use of the notion of essential contestation.
However, they differ in whether and how the function and the semantic or descrip-
tive criteria should be combined. Carver even completely dismisses the semantic cri-
teria and derives essential contestedness purely from how concepts are used in
essentially contested arguments.64 In my view, this turns Gallie’s notion upside
down, and transforms it into an extremely broad—and thus unproductive—label.
Ehrenberg treats all descriptive criteria as subordinate to the function.65 For Ehren-
berg, the function is predominant, and the descriptive criteria are only relevant (‘a
starting point’) in as far as they are helpful to understand the function. I suggest that
the semantic criteria and the function are of equal importance. We should ﬁnd an
understanding of the notion that can explain the four semantic criteria in light of
the function, and vice versa. The semantic criteria—the descriptive characteristics
that a certain category of concepts have in common—can only be fully understood
in light of the function, and the function can only be understood in light of these
characteristics.
My thesis is that these challenges may best be met by understanding essentially
contestable concepts in terms of ideal-orientation. The suggestion that essentially
contested concepts refer to ideals has been made by Gallie and various other
64 Carver (n 13).
65 Ehrenberg (n 9) 227.
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authors.66 The two core characteristics in Gallie’s presentation are that the concept
is evaluative and is internally complex. We may reconstruct this to mean that the
concept refers to an ideal or to a phenomenon that is oriented towards an ideal.
Or to provide a more precise deﬁnition: essentially contestable concepts are con-
cepts that refer to ideals or to concepts and phenomena that can only be fully under-
stood in the light of ideals, and that are, as a consequence, open to pervasive
contestation.
The understanding of ideals used in this analysis is a philosophical, more precise
one than the loose common-sense notion of ideals in which an ideal may refer to
ambitious or vague goals.67 Ideals may be conceived as complex values that are
usually not completely realisable, and that are often difﬁcult to formulate exactly.
We can never grasp the meaning of ideals completely; there is always a surplus of
meaning. Ideals partly transcend contingent, historical formulations and implemen-
tations. Therefore, they must be distinguished from mere goals, both because they
are more complex and because it is usually impossible to fully formulate or to fully
realise them. Although we may loosely say that Michael Phelps’ personal ideal was to
win Olympic gold, and this certainly is unrealisable for most of us, it is not an ideal in
the philosophical sense at stake here. We can formulate precisely what it is, and we
know how to determine whether Michael Phelps did succeed. Therefore, winning
Olympic gold must be considered a goal rather than an ideal.
Usually the focus in discussions of ideals is on the fact that they cannot be fully
realised.68 However, for understanding essentially contested concepts, it is the fact
that their meaning can never be formulated exactly which is the most important.
Because they have a surplus of meaning, they are open to different and conﬂicting
interpretations, in other words, to different conceptions. This surplus of meaning
also explains why ideals are key elements in pluralism and in controversy and
debate.69 Every conception is necessarily only a partial one, an only partly successful
attempt to grasp the full meaning of an ideal, and alternative conceptions may
66 See Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (n 1) 167; Swanton (n 7) 818; Waldron (n 5) 151.
67 This analysis of ideals builds on Wibren van der Burg and Sanne Taekema, ‘The Importance of Ideals:
Debating Their Relevance in Law, Morality, and Politics’ in Wibren van der Burg and Sanne Taekema
(eds), The Importance of Ideals: Debating Their Relevance in Law, Morality, and Politics (Peter Lang 2004)
11–38, 17–8. See also various other publications by Sanne Taekema and me, eg, Wibren van der Burg,
‘The Importance of Ideals’ (1997) 31 Journal of Value Inquiry 23; Sanne Taekema, The Concept of Ideals
in Legal Theory (Kluwer Law International 2002). Our critical reconstruction of the concept of ideals is
a combination of elements found in the work of pragmatist authors such as Philip Selznick, Lon Fuller
and Nicholas Rescher: Philip Selznick, The Moral Commonwealth (University of California Press 1992);
Fuller (n 23); Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals (Uni-
versity of California Press 1987). I have adapted the original deﬁnition we developed in order to
include a variety of ideals wider than simply those of law, morality, and politics discussed in that
article. Essentially contestable concepts may also refer to historical, religious and esthetic ideals.
Examples are ‘the Golden Age’, ‘a good Christian’ and ‘beauty’.
68 See, for example, Dorothy Emmet, The Role of the Unrealisable: A Study in Regulative Ideals (St Martin’s
Press 1994).
69 Van der Burg and Taekema, ‘The Importance of Ideals’ (n 67) 21–6. For the suggestion that ideals are
a source of pluralism, see also Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Claren-
don 1997) 146.
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therefore provide additional valuable insights. As a result, every conception is always
inherently open to contestation.
The reference to ideals in essentially contested concepts may be direct or indir-
ect. For example, concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘justice’ directly
refer to ideals.70 On the other hand, concepts such as good care refer indirectly
or implicitly to ideals, and it may not always be immediately clear that they do so.
Standards of good care can be understood in terms of minimum rules of care,
but they also have an aspirational dimension, which refers to an ideal of a good
caring relation or, in the context of health care, to the ideal of a good doctor or a
good nurse.71 As I will discuss in Section 5, many legal terms, such as ‘negligence’
or ‘secret elections’ only indirectly refer to ideals, and it may depend on the
degree of elaboration of those concepts in a speciﬁc jurisdiction whether it is
useful to regard them as essentially contested.
A reconstruction of essentially contestable concepts in terms of ideals pro-
vides a response to the challenges I distinguished in the beginning of this
section. Not only does it explain the four most important characteristics and
the function, it also provides unity and distinctiveness. Therefore, a reconstruc-
tion in terms of ideals presents the most charitable and most useful reconstruc-
tion of Gallie’s theory. I will show now in more detail that it can meet each of
the challenges.
Fit. If we understand Gallie’s reference to a valued achievement as a direct or
indirect reference to ideals, we can construct a coherent theory of essentially con-
testable concepts that accounts for all four semantic criteria. Ideals are values, and
are therefore evaluative (condition I). They are complex or, in Connolly’s terminol-
ogy, they are cluster concepts (condition II). In order to understand ideals, we must
refer to other complex ideals and constitutive values, as well as to intermediate
principles and rules. Each of these other elements, in turn, is also related to
further ideals with which they are associated, and thus may often be only under-
stood in the light of encompassing theories.72 For example, the ideal of democracy
relies on ideals such as freedom, equality, human rights, and tolerance; it refers to
intermediate principles such as the majority principle and one-man, one-vote; it is
related to—although it does not fully comprise—the ideal of the rule of law. In
their turn, the ideals of freedom, equality, human rights, and tolerance are also
complex. Even the more speciﬁc ideals (for example, freedom of religion) are
complex, though much less complex than general ideals such as the rule of law
and democracy.
Gallie’s conditions III and IV can also be easily accounted for if we understand
essentially contestable concepts in terms of ideals. As I argued above, ideals have a
70 This can also be a negative reference: ‘injustice’, ‘terrorism’ and ‘rape’ have also been regarded as
essentially contestable concepts: Collier and others (n 15) 216.
71 See Wibren van der Burg, Pieter Ippel and others, ‘The Care of a Good Caregiver: Legal and Ethical
Reﬂections on the Good Health Care Professional’ (1994) 3 Cambridge Quarterly of Health Care
Ethics 38.
72 For a similar view of how ideals or values must be understood and justiﬁed, see Ronald Dworkin, Justice
for Hedgehogs (Belknap Press 2011) 162.
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surplus of meaning, which implies that there can always be different and conﬂicting
interpretations. A concept referring to an ideal, thus, may give rise to a number of
competing conceptions, or, in Gallie’s terms, it must be variously describable (con-
dition III). Because ideals always have a surplus of meaning and can never be com-
pletely realised, they are also important factors in enabling change.73 In Gallie’s
terms, they are open and admit of variation in changing circumstances (condition
IV). Depending on variations in context, new dimensions of an ideal may become
appreciated, and some dimensions may be seen as more important than others in
the speciﬁc social conditions. For example, since the initial formulation describing
privacy as ‘the right to be left alone’,74 our understanding of the ideal of privacy has
changed drastically in response to social change and, more in particular, to techno-
logical developments.
Function. Ideal-orientation may also account for the function, as it explains why
pervasive disagreement is possible. Ideals have a surplus of meaning, and can never
be completely formulated. Every attempt to precisely formulate the meaning of an
ideal is thus open for contestation, because it inevitably has left out some aspects of
the ideal, or because it weighs the different values and principles comprised in the
ideal in a manner that is at variance with that of some critics. Although each of the
parties may believe her own conception to be the best, there is not one conception
that in abstracto is superior.75 The parties may have good reasons to prefer their own
conception, for example, that it emphasises precisely those dimensions of the ideal
that are most important for dealing with topical problems, or that it provides the
fullest account of the ideal in a particular context. For instance, a theory of democ-
racy in terms of equality—operationalised in terms of one-man, one-vote—may be
more attractive in the context of a state than in the context of industrial democracy;
in the latter, elements such as accountability, participation, and critical discussion
may be more important. However, there are no conclusive arguments as to why
one conception of democracy is the best one in general. Thus, debates about the
meaning can at best result in a provisional closure, but these closures are always
open to new contestations.
Unity. A certain degree of unity and distinctiveness is already provided by the
qualiﬁcation of the four most important criteria as semantic, and by the insight
that essentially contestable concepts are cluster concepts rather than merely
73 Ibid 27. On the role of ideals in enabling development see also Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick,
Law and Society in Transition. Toward Responsive Law (Harper & Row 1978); Rescher (n 67); Emmet
(n 68); as well as various contributions to Wibren van der Burg and Sanne Taekema (eds), The Impor-
tance of Ideals: Debating Their Relevance in Law, Morality, and Politics (Peter Lang 2004).
74 Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis, ‘The Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193.
75 This diverges from one interpretation of Dworkin’s Right Answer thesis—probably the dominant one
—namely, that there is always one right answer to a dispute. I suggest that a better interpretation of
this thesis is that the parties to a legal dispute sincerely believe that there is one answer for which there
are better arguments than for the alternatives, at least in the speciﬁc context of that legal dispute.
However, as Dworkin interpretations are notoriously controversial, I will not discuss the question
here whether this is the best interpretation of his work. I merely want to put my interpretation
forward as the best way to understand why ideals may give rise to pervasive disagreement in line
with Gallie’s theory. For Gallie’s view see footnotes 29–32 and the accompanying text.
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based on family resemblance. However, the insight that essentially contestable con-
cepts refer to one common ideal that can give rise to different and even mutually
exclusive conceptions of the ideal, as explained above, provides a more substantive
explanation of the concept’s unity.
Distinctiveness. In order to be useful, the notion of essential contestability should
mean more than merely hotly contested. Not all concepts that admit of competing
and incompatible conceptions should be qualiﬁed as essentially contestable. Deﬁ-
nition in terms of ideals makes it possible to distinguish essentially contestable con-
cepts from various other types of contested concepts, such as open-textured and
interpretive concepts.
First, essentially contestable concepts should be distinguished from those having
an open texture.76 One reason is that open textured concepts can be descriptive,
whereas essentially contestable concepts are always evaluative. The notion of the
open texture of ordinary language, as discussed by HLA Hart, primarily provides
an explanation for disagreement at the penumbra of descriptive concepts like
‘vehicle’.77 We may debate about whether a bicycle and roller skates qualify as
vehicles, but in principle this conﬂict can be solved by accepting a stipulative deﬁ-
nition. After that authoritative settlement, there is no reason for contestation left
—although new penumbra cases may always arise that ask for further speciﬁcation,
such as skateboards. The notion of open-texture of language is especially helpful for
understanding debates on what Dworkin calls vague criterial concepts.78 We may yet
be in search of a more precise demarcation criterion, but there is nothing that
makes a more precise criterion categorically impossible. Hart’s famous ‘no vehicles
in the park’ rule contains a vague criterial concept, but this vague concept of vehicle
does not refer to ideals, and after we have settled the vagueness, there is a clear rule.
A second reason why essentially contestable concepts and open textured con-
cepts are not identical is provided by Jeremy Waldron. He remarks that the contesta-
tion in the case of essentially contested concepts is not merely at the penumbra but
is at the core of the concept.79 The disagreement is not about marginal or border-
line cases but about paradigm or core cases. Some may hold that the United States is
a core case of democracy; others may hold that it lacks important features of social
democracy. According to Waldron, this disagreement is about the core or essence of
democracy. Similar points can be made with regard to the concept of ‘privacy’:
whether homosexual conduct between consenting adults in one’s bedroom is pro-
tected under this right is not a matter of the penumbra.80 So an analysis in terms
76 On the difference between open textured and essentially contestable concepts, see MacIntyre (n 45).
77 Hart (n 25) Ch 7, s 1.
78 Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Belknap Press 2006) 9. On the difference between interpretive, cri-
terial, and natural kind concepts, see also his Justice for Hedgehogs (n 72) 158–60. Natural kind concepts
can have an open texture too, but in the context of our discussion, this is irrelevant, since natural kind
concepts are descriptive and therefore can never be essentially contested.
79 Waldron (n 5) 149.
80 For a negative answer by the United States Supreme Court, see Bowers v Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986);
for a positive answer by the same court, see Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). For a much earlier
positive answer by the European Court of Human Rights, see Dudgeon v United Kingdom, no 7525/76,
ECHR 22 October 1981.
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of core and penumbra associated with the notion of open texture of law is different
from that of an analysis in terms of essentially contestable concepts, which often con-
cerns the core meaning of the concept. This contestation at the core can be
explained in terms of the surplus of meaning of ideals.
Second, essentially contestable concepts should not be identiﬁed with interpre-
tive concepts as deﬁned by Dworkin; they constitute only a subclass of the latter.
Dworkin suggests that interpretive and essentially contested are synonyms, but, in
my view, this is a mistake.81 In the class of interpretive concepts, Dworkin includes
some criterial or natural kind concepts, namely those that become temporarily con-
tested because they are embedded in law in a speciﬁc way. An example is the
concept of ‘book’ in a new sales tax, which, if left undeﬁned, might give rise to inter-
pretive conﬂicts (in fact, this example is similar to the ‘no vehicles in the park’
example).82 However, the concept of ‘book’ is not evaluative, so it cannot be essen-
tially contested according to Gallie’s analysis. There are many concepts in need of
interpretation because they are controversial or vague, but calling all these concepts
essentially contested would erase the distinction between simply contested and
essentially contested. The mere fact that a concept is interpretive and therefore con-
tested does not make it essentially contested.83
Robustness. The reconstruction of essentially contestable concepts in terms of
ideals is successful in terms of ﬁt, function, unity, and distinctiveness. This is
enough to accept it as a critical reconstruction. However, it also offers interesting
perspectives on Gallie’s condition VII, which I reconstructed as merely identifying
a potential, namely, that the contestation may promote a fuller awareness and a
better realisation of the values inherent in the concept.
If we rephrase it in terms of an ideal rather than of an original exemplar, this
condition identiﬁes an important insight. When participants or external observers
acknowledge that every formulation of an ideal, every conception, is only partly ade-
quate, they may regard alternative formulations as providing important insights and
helping to keep the full implications of ideals on the table. Continuous contestation
may prevent a permanent reduction of the meaning of the ideal to merely one con-
ception or to one ideological interpretation. The conception that has been
implemented through legislation by a majority in the past may have gained
81 Dworkin (n 78) 221.
82 Dworkin (n 72) 164–5.
83 My argument can also be made differently. I argue that there is an inconsistency in Dworkin’s work.
According to Dworkin, interpretive concepts are essentially contested concepts; according to Gallie,
essentially contested concepts are appraisive or evaluative; concepts such as ‘book’, ‘bald’ or ‘lion’ are
not evaluative, and thus cannot be essentially contested; therefore Dworkin’s suggestion that these
concepts can be temporarily interpretive cannot be correct––at least not if he wants to stick to
Gallie’s theory. In the text, I solve this inconsistency by denying his identiﬁcation of essentially con-
tested and interpretive concepts. Another alternative would be to restrict Dworkin’s deﬁnition of
interpretive concepts, and exclude descriptive concepts that have become controversial merely
because they are embedded in a normative context. This would make it possible to regard his
examples of ‘book’, ‘bald’ and ‘lion’ as examples of criterial and natural-kinds concepts that can tem-
porarily be contested, but not essentially contested. I believe this would be a better solution, but
defending this claim would require a muchmore elaborate exegesis of Dworkin’s work than is possible
in the context of this article.
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institutional authority, but it is never the last word. With its surplus of meaning, the
ideal always provides a source of criticism and renewal. However, the ideal merely
presents a potential for contestation and for an improvement of reality. It is very
well possible that a speciﬁc interpretation of the ideal has become so widely
accepted, and is so strongly engrained in law and other institutions, that it is
almost impossible to contest it, let alone that a contest leads to an effective challenge
of the dominant conception. There is no guarantee that a continuous contest will
lead to an optimal realisation of ideals. Nevertheless, the insight that ideals––and
therefore essentially contestable concepts as well––contain a potential for criticism
and improvement is an illuminating one, both for social activism by participants in
the contestation, and for scholars analysing the development of certain debates and
social practices.
5. A CONTROVERSIAL NOTION: SECOND-ORDER ESSENTIAL
CONTESTABILITY
It is often a matter of controversy as to whether a concept is essentially contestable. A
trivial explanation regarding some of these controversies has to do with the loose
way the notion is often used. Almost every concept that plays a role in debates
has been called essentially contested. Jeremy Waldron rightly remarks, ‘The idea
is clearly vulnerable to overuse’.84 Another explanation for the controversies is
that a concept may be contestable but not actually contested.
My critical reconstruction offers two more fundamental explanations as to why
there is sometimes not merely a ﬁrst-order contest about the meaning of the
concept in light of certain ideals, but also a second-order contest about whether a
concept is essentially contestable. These explanations are associated with the
central role of ideals in understanding essential contestability. The crucial point is
that it may be strongly controversial whether a concept should be partly understood
in terms of ideals. Moreover, as ideal orientation is a gradual characteristic, essential
contestability and essential contestedness are also gradual rather than digital
characteristics.
Some authors understand social phenomena in terms of functions or intentions
of actors; this usually involves referring to the values or aspirations inherent in the
phenomena. For example, Philip Selznick has argued that we can only understand
social phenomena such as law, family, or friendship in the light of their ‘master
ideals’.85 Other authors try to understand and operationalise social phenomena
in terms of empirically observable characteristics. A reference to intentions,
let alone to ideals with their surplus of meaning, would undermine this attempt.
Consequently, most positivists tend to prefer a value-neutral understanding of
social concepts, whereas different types of non-positivists hold that this is impossible.
84 Waldron (n 5) 148.
85 Selznick (n 23).
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For the ﬁrst group, those concepts are not essentially contested, but for the latter
they are.86
Concepts that give rise to controversies about whether they are essentially con-
tested may be named second-order essentially contested concepts.87 A second-order
essentially contested concept may be deﬁned as a concept that is reasonably
regarded as essentially contested by some, whereas others reasonably deny that it
is essentially contested. A second-order essentially contestable concept may be
deﬁned as a concept that can reasonably be regarded as essentially contestable by
some, whereas others can reasonably deny that it is essentially contestable.
Every ﬁrst-order essentially contested or contestable concept is also second-
order essentially contestable. For every concept that is treated by some authors as
referring, directly or indirectly, to an ideal, someone might come up with a con-
ception that does not refer to ideals. Even a concept as ‘justice’ could be interpreted
in clear descriptive terms like ‘giving everyone exactly the same’. Of course, it is
highly unlikely, and most people would say that this does not fully grasp the
meaning of the concept—and, as a philosopher, I might add that the reason is
that this conception fails to do justice to the ideal-oriented character of the
concept. Even so, it is not unthinkable that someone might come up with a value-
neutral, purely descriptive conception of the concept. This theoretical possibility
exists for all essentially contestable concepts.
This shows that every essentially contested concept is also second-order essen-
tially contestable. However, not every such concept will actually be second-order con-
tested. For some concepts, the value-laden character is difﬁcult to deny. The
evaluative dimension is central to our understanding of the concept, and this evalu-
ation refers to a complex achievement rather than one that is simple and measur-
able. For such concepts, the ideal-orientation of the concept cannot reasonably
be denied, and therefore the essential contestability cannot reasonably be denied.
Examples are ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’. These are essentially contested concepts that
are not second-order essentially contested.
The notion of second-order contestability is thus quite trivial because all essen-
tially contested/contestable concepts are also second-order contestable. However,
the notion of second-order contestedness is an important one. I suggest that
second-order contested concepts can be part of the explanation for some theoreti-
cal debates in the humanities and social sciences, but in the context of this article,
I cannot explore that suggestion. I will only illustrate it with one debate, namely that
between the various schools in legal philosophy, in the next Section.
86 An exception in the positivist tradition is Radbruch who holds that law is oriented towards ideals or
values, but combines that in his early work with a legal positivist theory. Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphi-
losophie (8ste Auﬂ, Hrsg von E Wolf und H-P Schneider) (KF Koehler 1974).
87 The possibility of a second-order contestability of the claim that a concept is essentially contested or
contestable has been mentioned by various authors; for instance, by Gray (n 20) 339. I brieﬂy men-
tioned the idea that law is a second-order essentially contested concept in Wibren van der Burg,
The Dynamics of Law and Morality: A Pluralist Account of Legal Interactionism (Ashgate 2014) 47; this
article is an attempt to elaborate this tentative suggestion.
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Before doing that, however, there is one further observation to be made. Essen-
tial contestability and contestedness are gradual notions.88 The degree of contest-
ability may vary with the complexity and with the aspirational character of the
concept. Ideals can be more or less complex; the more complex a notion, the
more it is open to be essentially contested. ‘Justice’ and ‘the good society’ are
more complex than ‘freedom of religion’; hence there is a greater contestability.
A concept can also be more strongly contestable if its aspirational character is
stronger. Concepts that directly refer to ideals are more strongly contestable than
partly descriptive concepts that more indirectly refer to ideals. In some concepts,
like ‘democracy’, the ideal dimension is clearly visible. In other concepts, like
‘secrecy of elections’, it is only very indirect. The secrecy of elections can be described
as an element of the complex ideal of democracy, yet inmost jurisdictions it has been
legally elaborated upon in very precise formulations. Thus, the legally enforced con-
ception of secret elections only indirectly refers to the ideal of democracy, and may
sometimes be scarcely contested. As a result, the ideal of democracy only plays an
indirect and marginal role in our understanding of the secrecy of elections, and
thus the concept of ‘secrecy of elections’ is only marginally essentially contested.
For practical purposes, in these marginal cases we may analyse the concept ade-
quately without reference to underlying ideals. It only makes matters unnecessarily
complex if we nevertheless call it essentially contestable—even if it can be shown
theoretically that it is. This will especially be true for many legal concepts that
have been elaborated upon in statutes and case law, resulting in a relatively com-
plete and coherent legal doctrine that is generally accepted. Examples may be con-
cepts like ‘negligence’ or ‘medical malpractice’. Although they indirectly refer to
ideals such as good care or good medical practice, in positive law they have been
so robustly elaborated upon that a reference to these underlying ideals is usually
not useful in practice. Still, there may be occasions when we do have to refer to
those ideals, in order to re-examine and reconstruct our conceptions: for
example, when social views change regarding responsibility for harm to future gen-
erations, or when new medical technologies are discovered. It may also be true for
moral concepts or political concepts on which a strong overlapping consensus exists
—at least in the relevant forum. For example, within a speciﬁc jurisdiction, there
may be a broad consensus both on what ‘democracy’ implies and on the judgment
that this society is democratic.
The gradual character of essential contestedness may lead to disagreements on
whether a concept is in fact essentially contested.Anexample is providedbyArnoldHei-
denheimer,whoargues that, since theerosionof communism, ‘democracy’—oneof the
central examples inGallie’swork—hasbecome less essentially contested, and that itnow
should be considered a formerly essentially contested concept.89 It may be doubted
whether this judgment is empirically correct. Compare views on democracy in the US
with those in Denmark, and it is clear that very different conceptions still exist. Even
so, we can understand Heidenheimer’s suggestion—it is not completely unintelligible
88 Ehrenberg (n 9) 214, 227.
89 Heidenheimer (n 8).
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or absurd. This illustrates the theoretical possibility that a concept may become decon-
tested.90Usually,however,while someauthorsbelieve that themeaningof concepts such
as ‘democracy’ or ‘rule of law’ has been conclusively settled in positive law, or is ﬁrmly
embedded in an overlapping consensus, others will disagree.
6. LAW AS A SECOND-ORDER ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT
Few legal theorists would deny that at least somepersistent legal debates, for example,
on ‘justice’ or ‘fairness’might be fruitfully analysed in terms of essentially contested
concepts. However, although there is a broad consensus that some legal concepts can
be essentially contested, there is certainly no consensus among legal philosophers on
whether the concept of ‘law’ itself is essentially contested.91 This is a good example of
second-order essential contestedness. I suggest that this idea can help us understand
the debate in legal philosophy between positivists and their opponents. Certainly, I
don’t want to claim that this is the only issue that divides the parties—and sometimes
also the groups within one camp.92 For example, the various traditions are also
divided on issues as whether law can be described as separate from morality,
and whether law is typically connected to the state or to force, and on various
other themes. Moreover, I have claimed elsewhere that there is a much more fun-
damental difference between the competing traditions in legal philosophy.93 This
more fundamental explanation is that law can be seen as an essentially ambiguous
concept—a concept that can be modelled in at least two incompatible ways, as a
product or doctrine, and as a practice.94 I have argued that this epistemological
difference is the most fundamental one in many philosophical debates. However,
I will not repeat that analysis here. In this article, I cannot do justice to all
nuances in the debate between positivists and non-positivists, I just want to
draw attention to one aspect of it.
90 On decontestation, see Collier and others (n 15) 222.
91 See Dworkin (n 78) 221: ‘Lawyers share the concept of law as what I call an interpretive (or essentially
contested) concept.’ There is no explicit reference to Gallie here, but there is one in Taking Rights
Seriously (n 25) 103 n1. Among those arguing that law is not an essentially contested concept are
Leslie Green, ‘The Political Content of Legal Theory’ (1987) 17 Philosophy of the Social Sciences
1; Ehrenberg (n 9).
92 For a fuller discussion of various issues that underlie the debate, see Van der Burg (n 87) Part One, esp
19–21.
93 Ibid, Part One.
94 I ﬁrst discussed the notion of essentially ambiguous concepts in Wibren van der Burg, ‘Essentially
Ambiguous Concepts and The Fuller-Hart-Dworkin Debate’ (2009) 95 Archiv für Rechts-und Sozial-
philosophie 305; a further elaboration can be found in Van der Burg, The Dynamics of Law and Morality
(n 87). Both essentially contested concepts and essentially ambiguous concepts give rise to pervasive
pluralism. However, there is a fundamental difference in the explanation for why the concept allows
of competing conceptions. For the ﬁrst, the explanation lies in the evaluative character of the
concept, for the second it lies in the dynamic character of the phenomenon which can only ade-
quately be described by using two alternate models. Essentially ambiguous concepts are primarily
descriptive concepts (although they can have an evaluative dimension), essentially contested concepts
are primarily evaluative concepts (although they can have a descriptive dimension). For a further
elaboration and comparison, see van der Burg (n 87) 45–8.
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Gallie is unclear about whether ‘law’ is an essentially contested concept. In the
book version, he groups the concepts of ‘science’ and ‘law’ together as possible can-
didates, although he doubts whether they fully ﬁt the framework.95 Earlier, he shows
no doubt about the concept of ‘science’; it is essentially contested.96 Therefore, it is
plausible that Gallie regards ‘law’ as essentially contested as well, as it belongs to the
same group of concepts as ‘science’.97
Many legal positivists like Hart claim that ‘law’ is a normatively neutral
concept.98 Therefore, for those who accept that claim, ‘law’ cannot be an essentially
contested concept.99 Non-positivists, however, usually argue that we cannot under-
stand law if we do not focus on the master ideal, the purpose, or the leading
values of law.100 Different conceptions of these ideals, purposes, or values are legit-
imate. Consequently, for those non-positivists, ‘law’ is an essentially contested
concept. In the view of these authors, positivists are merely blind to this unavoidable
normative dimension of ‘law’, but their position would be understood and defended
better if they simply acknowledged it. An example of this is Ronald Dworkin’s
attempt to describe jurisprudential debates in terms of different conceptions of ‘leg-
ality’.101 However, chances are slim that Dworkin will be able to convince his positi-
vist opponents that this is the best way to reconstruct the debate. They will probably
deny the basic presupposition that law is essentially oriented towards a normative
ideal or value.102 Positivists like Hart regard ‘law’ as a normatively neutral concept
that, therefore, cannot be essentially contested, whereas Dworkin regards it as an
essentially contested concept. This is a second-order contest on whether ‘law’ is
an essentially contested concept. In other words, ‘law’ is a second-order essentially
contested concept.
If we regard ‘law’ as a second-order essentially contested concept, this also has
implications for whether it is possible to construe a generally accepted deﬁnition
of ‘law’. Many authors have sought to identify the speciﬁc characteristics of law,
the properties that distinguish law from other normative orders. They have been
95 Gallie, Philosophy and the Historical Understanding (n1) 190.
96 Ibid 156.
97 For a different interpretation, see Ehrenberg (n 9) 220 who argues that Gallie himself was in doubt
about the concept of law. However, from the text we can only infer that ‘law’ and ‘science’ do not meet
the criteria fully, but that they are in most relevant respects similar to the concepts that are explicitly
analysed as being essentially contested. As I discussed earlier (and as Ehrenberg himself accepts as
well), the fact that a concept does not fully meet all criteria need not be a reason for not calling it
essentially contested, because Gallie presents the seven conditions as ideal typical rather than as
necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. A similar mistake is made by Leslie Green (n 91) 18, when he
incorrectly deduces from Gallie’s acknowledgment that ‘law’ is not in all respects similar to the
clear examples of essentially contested concepts that he ‘explicitly excluded’ the concept of law.
This is an extreme interpretation that is clearly at odds with the fact that Gallie called the concept
of law a possible candidate.
98 Hart (n 25) 240.
99 See Ehrenberg (n 9) 223; Green (n 91) 19 (both authors arguing that the general concept of law need
not always be evaluative).
100 See Selznick (n 23); Fuller (n 23); Dworkin (n 78).
101 See Dworkin (n 78) 171ff.
102 Many positivists have understood law in terms of its point or function, but that does not necessarily
require reference to ideals.
254 W. van der Burg
looking for the ‘distinctively legal’. Some authors even argue that this is the central
task of legal philosophy. Indeed, according to Julie Dickson, the core business of
analytical jurisprudence is ‘to isolate and explain those features which make law
into what it is’.103
However, if we accept that ‘law’ is a second-order essentially contested concept,
this implies that there is a substantial problem in deﬁning the distinctively legal.
At the second-order level, it is contested whether law is inherently oriented
towards certain values, such as legality or justice. Moreover, among those who
hold that law is oriented towards certain values, it is essentially contested which
values they are, and how they should be interpreted. Is legality the master ideal
of law, as Selznick and Fuller hold, or are there other ideals such as justice,
legal security, and purposiveness, as Radbruch holds?104 If these ideals are the
basis for some form of substantive natural law, what is its content? Is it merely a
minimum content as held by Hart, or a more substantive set as defended by
Finnis?105
Of course, this is not a conclusive argument that we cannot ﬁnd other character-
istics that are distinctively legal. After all, there could be certain minimal descriptive
elements like the suggestion of a combination of primary and secondary rules
(Hart) or of institutionalisation (Raz). I will not go into that debate here. Sufﬁce
it to say that there is also broad disagreement on these other suggested character-
istics of law.106 Even if it were possible among positivists to ﬁnd a broad consensus
on certain characteristics, however, the result would only be a list of very minimal
necessary conditions. Together, they could never constitute the necessary and sufﬁ-
cient conditions to characterise the distinctively legal. The reason is simple; for
many non-positivists, these characteristics cannot be sufﬁcient conditions, because
in a complete list of them the orientation to speciﬁc legal values or ideals should
have a central place. In other words, one reason—but again: one reason among
many others—that positivists and non-positivists cannot agree is that ‘law’ is a
second-order essentially contested concept.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have presented a critical reconstruction of the notion of essentially
contested and essentially contestable concepts. As a ﬁrst step, I have argued that
Gallie’s seven conditions for essential contestedness should be divided into four
semantic criteria, which are central to our understanding of the notion of essential
contestability, and three pragmatic criteria, which mostly should be disregarded as
deﬁning criteria. Moreover, we should make a distinction between contested and
103 Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart 2001) 17. For a critical review of this position, see Fre-
derick Schauer, The Force of Law (Harvard University Press 2015), 35–41; Van der Burg (n 87) Ch 5.
104 See Selznick (n 23); Fuller (n 23); Radbruch (n 86). On Radbruch and Selznick, see Taekema (n 67).
105 Hart (n 25) 193–200; Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press 1980).
106 Schauer (n 103) argues convincingly that we should replace the search for essential or universal
characteristics by a search for typical or general characteristics.
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contestable—essentially contested concepts are essentially contestable concepts that
are actually contested. As a second step, I have argued that we should understand
essentially contestable concepts in terms of ideal-orientation. Essentially contestable
concepts may be deﬁned as concepts that refer to ideals or to concepts and phenom-
ena that can only be fully understood in light of ideals and that are, as a conse-
quence, open to pervasive contestation. Understanding contestability in terms of
ideals provides a reconstruction that can be illuminating for our analysis of pervasive
conceptual disagreements.
However, we should accept that it might be a matter of endless dispute as to
whether a concept is essentially contestable. Because the thesis that a phenomenon
can only be understood in terms of an inherently ideal-oriented character is often
strongly contested, the related concept may be called second-order essentially con-
tested. Moreover, both essential contestability and essential contestedness may be a
matter of degree.
I have illustrated this possibility of second-order essential contestedness with the
concept of law. Although legal ideals such as the rule of law are quite broadly
accepted as being essentially contested, this is different for the concept of law.
Some authors argue that it is ideal-oriented, whereas others claim it is not. This
insight that ‘law’ is a second-order essentially contested concept may explain
some of the disagreements between the school of legal positivism and its various
opponents. Moreover, it may explain why the search for the ‘distinctively legal’ is
often futile.
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